ABSTRACT. Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge. We develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge. We define a Kripke-style semantics that is similar to Fitting's semantics for the Logic of Proofs LP. We show the soundness, completeness, and finite model property of our multi-agent justification logic with respect to this Kripke-style semantics. We demonstrate that our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal bimodal explicit evidence logic, which is a two-agent version of LP. We discuss the relationship of our logic to the multi-agent modal logic S4 with common knowledge. Finally, we give a brief analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the newly developed language of our logic.
Introduction
Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge (Artemov, 2008) . The first logic of this kind, the Logic of Proofs LP, was developed by Artemov to provide the modal logic S4 with provability semantics (Artemov, 1995; Artemov, 2001) . The language of justification logics has also been used to create a new approach to the logical omniscience problem (Artemov et al., 2009) and to study self-referential proofs (Kuznets, 2010) . Artemov has shown that the Logic of Proofs LP is an explicit 1 counterpart of the modal logic S4 in the following formal sense: each theorem of LP becomes a theorem of S4 if all the terms are replaced with the modality ; and, vice versa, each theorem of S4 can be transformed into a theorem of LP if the occurrences of modality are replaced with suitable evidence terms (Artemov, 2001) . The latter process is called realization, and the statement of correspondence is called a realization theorem. Note that the operation + introduced by the sum axiom in Fig. 1 does not have a modal analog, but it is an essential part of the proof of the realization theorem in (Artemov, 2001) . Explicit counterparts for many normal modal logics between K and S5 have been developed (see a recent survey in (Artemov, 2008) and a uniform proof of realization theorems for all single-agent justification logics in (Brünnler et al., 2010) ).
The notion of common knowledge is essential in the area of multi-agent systems, where coordination among agents is a central issue. For a thorough introduction to epistemic logics in general and to common knowledge in particular, one can refer to the standard textbooks (Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer et al., 1995) . Informally, common knowledge of A is defined as the infinitary conjunction everybody knows A and everybody knows that everybody knows A and so on. This is equivalent to saying that common knowledge of A is the greatest fixed point of λX.(everybody knows A and everybody knows X) .
(1)
An explicit counterpart of McCarthy's any fool knows common knowledge modality (McCarthy et al., 1978) , where common knowledge of A is defined as an arbitrary fixed point of (1), is presented in (Artemov, 2006) . The relationship between the traditional common knowledge from (Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer et al., 1995) and McCarthy's version is studied in (Antonakos, 2007) .
In this paper, we develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge, with the intention to provide an explicit counterpart of the h-agent modal logic of traditional common knowledge S4 C h . For the sake of compactness and readability, we will not treat groups of agents.
Multi-agent justification logics with evidence terms for each agent are considered in (Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2008; Renne, 2009a; Artemov, 2010) , but common knowledge is not present in any of them. Renne's system combines features of modal and dynamic epistemic logics (Renne, 2009a) and hence cannot be directly compared to our system. Artemov's interest lies mostly in exploring a case of two agents with unequal epistemic powers: e.g., Artemov's Observer has sufficient evidence to reproduce the Object Agent's thinking, but not vice versa (Artemov, 2010) . Yavorskaya studies various operations of evidence transfer between agents (Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2008). Yavorskaya's minimal 2 two-agent justification logic LP 2 , which is an explicit counterpart of S4 2 , is the closest to our system. We will show that in the case of two agents our system is a conservative extension of LP 2 .
An epistemic semantics for LP, F-models, was created by Fitting by augmenting Kripke models with an evidence function that specifies which formulae are evidenced by a term at a given world (Fitting, 2005) . Independently, Mkrtychev proved a stronger completeness result for LP with respect to singleton F-models (Mkrtychev, 1997) , now known as M-models, where the role of the accessibility relation is completely taken over by the evidence function. The semantics of F-models has been adapted to the whole family of single-agent justification logics (for details, see (Artemov, 2008) ). Artemov extends F-models to the language with both evidence terms for McCarthy's common knowledge modality and ordinary modalities for the individual agents (Artemov, 2006) , creating the most general type of epistemic models, sometimes called AF-models, where common evidence terms are given their own accessibility relation, which does not directly depend on the accessibility relations for individual modalities. The absence of ordinary modalities in Yavorskaya's two-agent justification systems provides for a stronger completeness result with respect to M-models (Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce a language and give an axiomatization of a family of multi-agent justification logics with common knowledge. In Sect. 3, we prove their basic properties including the internalization property, which is characteristic of all justification logics. In Sect. 4, we develop an epistemic semantics and prove soundness and completeness with respect to this semantics as well as with respect to singleton models, thereby demonstrating the finite model property. In Sect. 5, we show that for the two-agent case, our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal two-agent justification logic. In Sect. 6, we demonstrate how our logic is related to the modal logic of traditional common knowledge and discuss the problem of realization. In Sect. 7, we provide an analysis of the coordinated attack problem in our logic. Finally, in Sect. 8, we discuss how the newly introduced terms affect the agents, including their ability to communicate information in various communication modes.
Syntax
To create an explicit counterpart of the modal logic of common knowledge S4 C h , we use its axiomatization via the induction axiom from (Meyer et al., 1995) rather than via the induction rule to facilitate proving the internalization property for the resulting justification logic. We supply each agent with its own copy of terms from the Logic of Proofs, while terms for common and mutual knowledge employ additional operations. The fact that each agent has its own set of operations makes our framework more flexible. For instance, agents may be thought of as representing different arithmetical proof systems that use different encodings (cf. (Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2008)).
As motivated in (Bucheli et al., 2010b) , a proof of CA can be viewed as an infinite list of proofs of the conjuncts E m A from the representation of common knowledge through an infinite conjunction. To generate a finite representation of this infinite list, we use an explicit counterpart of the induction axiom
with a binary operation ind(·, ·). To facilitate access to the elements of the list, explicit counterparts of the co-closure axiom provide evidence terms that can be seen as splitting the infinite list into its head and tail,
by means of two unary co-closure operations ccl 1 (·) and ccl 2 (·).
Evidence terms for mutual knowledge are viewed as tuples of the individual agents' evidence terms. The standard tupling operation and h unary projections are employed as means of translation between the individual agents' and mutual knowledge evidence. Note that, strictly speaking, evidence terms for mutual knowledge are not necessary because they could be defined, just like the modality for mutual knowledge can be defined in the modal case. However, the resulting system would be very cumbersome in notation and usage.
While only two of the three operations on LP terms (see Fig. 1 ) are adopted for common knowledge evidence and none is adopted for mutual knowledge evidence, it will be shown in Sect. 3 that three out of the four remaining operations are definable, with a notable exception of inspection for mutual knowledge, as is to be expected. While the usage of the application operation for common knowledge evidence terms is justifiable on the grounds of the corresponding modal (K) axiom for common knowledge, the necessity of the sum operation for common knowledge evidence terms is less clear and can only be shown once the realization theorem is proved (see Sect. 6 for details).
We consider a system of h agents. Throughout the paper, i always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h}, * always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h, C}, and always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h, E, C}.
Let Cons := {c 1 , c 2 , . . . } and Var := {x 1 , x 2 , . . . } be countable sets of proof constants and proof variables respectively for each . The sets Tm 1 , . . . , Tm h , Tm E , and Tm C of evidence terms for individual agents and for mutual and common knowledge respectively are inductively defined as follows:
1. Cons ⊆ Tm and Var ⊆ Tm ; 2. ! i t ∈ Tm i for any t ∈ Tm i ; 3. t + * s ∈ Tm * and t · * s ∈ Tm * for any t, s ∈ Tm * ; 4. t 1 , . . . , t h ∈ Tm E for any t 1 ∈ Tm 1 , . . . , t h ∈ Tm h ; 5. π i t ∈ Tm i for any t ∈ Tm E ; 6. ccl 1 (t) ∈ Tm E and ccl 2 (t) ∈ Tm E for any t ∈ Tm C ; 7. ind(t, s) ∈ Tm C for any t ∈ Tm C and any s ∈ Tm E . Tm := Tm 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm h ∪ Tm E ∪ Tm C denotes the set of all evidence terms. The indices of the operations !, +, and · will most often be omitted if they can be inferred from the context. A term is called ground if no proof variables occur in it.
Let Prop := {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } be a countable set of propositional variables. Formulae are denoted by A, B, C, . . . and are defined by the grammar
where t ∈ Tm and P j ∈ Prop. The set of all formulae is denoted by Fm LP C h . We adopt the following convention: whenever a formula [t] A is used, it is assumed to be well-formed: i.e., it is implicitly assumed that term t ∈ Tm . This enables us to omit the explicit typification of terms.
Axioms of LP
A constant specification CS is any subset For a constant specification CS, the deductive system LP C h (CS) is the Hilbert system given by the axioms of LP C h above and by the rules modus ponens and axiom necessitation:
By LP C h we denote the system LP C h (CS) with
For an arbitrary CS, we write ∆ CS A to state that A is derivable from a set of formulae ∆ in LP C h (CS) and omit CS when working with the constant specification from (2) by writing ∆ A. We also omit ∆ when ∆ = ∅ and write CS A or A, in which case A is called a theorem of LP C h (CS) or of LP C h respectively. We use ∆, A to mean ∆ ∪ {A}.
Basic properties
In this section, we show that our logic possesses the standard properties expected of any justification logic. In addition, we show that the operations on terms introduced in the previous section are sufficient to express the operations of sum and application for mutual knowledge evidence and the operation of inspection for common knowledge evidence. This is the reason why + E , · E , and ! C are not primitive connectives in the language. It should be noted that no inspection operation for mutual evidence terms can be defined, which follows from Lemma 28 in Sect. 6 and the fact that EA → EEA is not a valid modal formula. LEMMA 1. -For any constant specification CS and any formulae A and B:
(E-reflexivity)
2. for any t, s ∈ Tm E , there is a term t · E s ∈ Tm E such that
3. for any t, s ∈ Tm E , there is a term t + E s ∈ Tm E such that
4. for any t ∈ Tm C and any i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, there is a term ↓ i t ∈ Tm i such that
PROOF. -1. Immediate by the projection and reflexivity axioms.
5. Immediate by 4. and the reflexivity axiom.
Unlike Lemma 1, Lemma 2 requires that a constant specification CS be C-axiomatically appropriate.
LEMMA 2. -Let CS be C-axiomatically appropriate and A be a formula.
1. For any t ∈ Tm C , there is a term ! C t ∈ Tm C such that
2. For any t ∈ Tm C , there is a term t ∈ Tm C such that
The existence of constants c and c is guaranteed by the C-appropriateness of CS.
The following two lemmas are standard in justification logics. Their proofs can be taken almost word for word from (Artemov, 2001) and are, therefore, omitted here.
LEMMA 3 (DEDUCTION THEOREM). -Let CS be a constant specification and
LEMMA 4 (SUBSTITUTION). -For any constant specification CS, any propositional variable P , any ∆ ∪ {A, B} ⊆ Fm LP C h , any x ∈ Var , and any t ∈ Tm , if ∆ CS A, then ∆(x/t, P/B) CS(x/t,P/B) A(x/t, P/B) , where A(x/t, P/B) denotes the formula obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of x in A with t and all occurrences of P in A with B and ∆(x/t, P/B) and CS(x/t, P/B) are defined accordingly.
The following lemma states that our logic can internalize its own proofs, which is an important property of justification logics.
LEMMA 5 (C-LIFTING). -Let CS be a homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formulae A, B 1 , . . . , B n , C 1 , . . . , C m and any terms s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ Tm C , if
for fresh variables x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Var C and y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ Var .
PROOF. -We proceed by induction on the derivation of A.
If A is an axiom, there is a constant c ∈ Cons C such that [c] C A ∈ CS because CS is C-axiomatically appropriate. Then take
and use axiom necessitation, axiom necessitation and i-conversion, or axiom necessitation and the co-closure axiom respectively.
for a fresh variable x j ∈ Var C and, after x j is replaced with s j , use C-inspection, C-inspection and i-conversion, or the co-closure axiom respectively.
For A = C j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, take t := y j for a fresh variable y j ∈ Var .
For A derived by modus ponens from D → A and D, by induction hypothesis there are terms r , s ∈ Tm such that [r ] (D → A) and [s ] D are derivable. Take t := r · s and use -application, which is an axiom for = i and for = C or follows from Lemma 1 for = E.
and use C-inspection, C-inspection and i-conversion, or the co-closure axiom respectively. No other instances of the axiom necessitation rule are possible. Indeed, CS must contain formulae of the type [c] C E because of C-axiomatic appropriateness. The homogeneity of CS then means that formulae neither of type
COROLLARY 6 (CONSTRUCTIVE NECESSITATION). -Let CS be a homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formula A, if CS A, then for each there is a ground term t ∈ Tm such that
The following two lemmas show that our system LP C h can internalize versions of the induction rule used in various axiomatizations of S4 C h (see (Bucheli et al., 2010b) for a discussion of several axiomatizations of this kind).
LEMMA 7 (INTERNALIZED INDUCTION RULE 1 ). -Let CS be a homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any term s ∈ Tm E and any
It remains to use the induction axiom and propositional reasoning.
LEMMA 8 (INTERNALIZED INDUCTION RULE 2). -Let CS be a homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formulae A and B and any term s ∈ Tm E , if we have
From this we immediately get
. Thus, by Lemma 7, there is a t ∈ Tm C with
Since CS is C-axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c ∈ Cons C such that
Making use of C-application, we find by (4) and (5) that
From (3) we get by E-reflexivity that CS B → A ∧ B. This, together with (6), finally
4. Soundness and completeness DEFINITION 9. -An (epistemic) model meeting a constant specification CS is a structure M = (W, R, E, ν), where (W, R, ν) is a Kripke model for S4 h with a set of possible worlds W = ∅, with a function R : {1, . . . , h} → P(W × W ) that assigns a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation on W to each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, and with a truth valuation ν : Prop → P(W ). We always write R i instead of R(i) and define the accessibility relations for mutual and common knowledge in the standard way:
An evidence function E : W × Tm → P Fm LP C h determines the formulae evidenced by a term at a world. We define E := E (W × Tm ). Note that whenever A ∈ E (w, t), it follows that t ∈ Tm . The evidence function E must satisfy the following closure conditions: for any worlds w, v ∈ W ,
When the model is clear from the context, we will directly refer to
DEFINITION 10. -A ternary relation M, w A for formula A being satisfied at a world w ∈ W in a model M = (W, R, E, ν) is defined by induction on the structure of the formula A:
1. M, w P n if and only if w ∈ ν(P n ); 2. behaves classically with respect to the propositional connectives;
M, w [t]
A if and only if 1) A ∈ E (w, t) and
We write CS A and say that formula A is valid with respect to CS if M A for all epistemic models M meeting CS.
LEMMA 11 (SOUNDNESS). -All theorems are valid: CS A implies CS A.
PROOF. -Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model meeting CS and let w ∈ W . We show soundness by induction on the derivation of A. The cases for propositional tautologies, for the application, sum, reflexivity, and inspection axioms, and for the modus ponens rule are the same as for the single-agent case in (Fitting, 2005) and are, therefore, omitted. We show the remaining five cases:
A whenever (w, v) ∈ R i and 2) A ∈ E i (w, t i ). By the tupling closure condition, it follows from 2) that A ∈ E E (w, t 1 , . . . , t h ). Since
A whenever (w, v) ∈ R E and 2) A ∈ E E (w, t). By the projection closure condition, it follows from 2) that A ∈ E i (w, π i t). In addition, since
2) A ∈ E C (w, t). It follows from 1) that M, v A whenever (w, v ) ∈ R E since R E ⊆ R C ; also, due to the monotonicity closure condition, M, v
[t] C A since R E •R C ⊆ R C . By the co-closure closure condition, it follows from 2) that A ∈ E E (w, ccl 1 (t)) and
. From the second assumption and the reflexivity of R C , we get M, w A → [s] E A; thus, M, w
[s] E A by the first assumption. So A ∈ E E (w, s) and, by the second assumption, A → [s] E A ∈ E C (w, t). By the induction closure condition, we have A ∈ E C (w, ind(t, s)). To show that M, v A whenever (w, v) ∈ R C , we prove that M, v A whenever (w, v) ∈ (R E ) n by induction on the positive integer n.
The base case n = 1 immediately follows from M, w [s] E A.
Finally, we conclude that M, w [ind(t, s)] C A.
(axiom necessitation) Let [c] A ∈ CS. Since A must be an axiom, M, w A for all w ∈ W , as shown above. Since M is a model meeting CS, we also have A ∈ E (w, c) for all w ∈ W by the constant specification closure condition.
DEFINITION 12. -Let CS be a constant specification. A set Φ of formulae is called CS-consistent if Φ CS φ for some formula φ. A set Φ is called maximal CS-consistent if it is CS-consistent and has no CS-consistent proper extensions.
Whenever safe, we do not mention the constant specification and only talk about consistent and maximal consistent sets. It can be easily shown that maximal consistent sets contain all axioms of LP C h and are closed under modus ponens. DEFINITION 13. -For a set Φ of formulae, we define Φ/ := {A : there is a t ∈ Tm such that [t] A ∈ Φ} . DEFINITION 14. -Let CS be a constant specification. The canonical (epistemic) model M = (W, R, E, ν) meeting CS is defined as follows:
4. ν(P n ) := {w ∈ W : P n ∈ w}.
LEMMA 15. -Let CS be a constant specification. The canonical epistemic model meeting CS is an epistemic model meeting CS.
PROOF. -The proof of the reflexivity and transitivity of each R i , as well as the argument for the constant specification, application, sum, and inspection closure conditions, is the same as in the single-agent case (see (Fitting, 2005) ). We show the remaining five closure conditions:
Therefore, by the tupling axiom and maximal consistency,
Therefore, by the projection axiom and maximal consistency,
(co-closure) Assume A ∈ E C (w, t). By definition of E C , we have [t] C A ∈ w. Therefore, by the co-closure axioms and maximal consistency, [ccl 1 (t)] E A ∈ w and
.1) and the induction axiom, it follows by maximal consistency that A ∈ w and [ind(t, s)] C A ∈ w. Therefore, A ∈ E C (w, ind(t, s)).
(monotonicity) We show only the case of * = C since the other cases are the same as in (Fitting, 2005) . It is sufficient to prove by induction on the positive integer n that
Base case n = 1. Assume (w, v) ∈ R E : i.e., w/i ⊆ v for some i.
The argument for the induction step is similar.
REMARK 16. -Let R C denote the binary relation on W defined by (w, v) ∈ R C if and only if w/C ⊆ v .
An argument similar to the one just used for monotonicity shows that R C ⊆ R C . However, for h > 1 the converse does not hold for any homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS, which we demonstrate by adapting an example from (Meyer et al., 1995) . For a fixed propositional variable P , let
This set is CS-consistent for any P ∈ Prop.
To prove this, let Φ ⊆ Φ be finite and let m denote the largest nonnegative integer such that [s m ] E . . . [s 1 ] E P ∈ Φ for some s 1 , . . . , s m ∈ Tm E (in particular, m = 0 if no such terms exist). Define the model
• E N (n, s) := Fm LP C h for all n ∈ N and all terms s ∈ Tm;
• ν N (P j ) := {1, 2, . . . , m + 1} for all P j ∈ Prop.
Clearly, N meets any constant specification; in particular, it meets the given CS. For h > 1, it can also be easily verified that N , 1 Φ ; therefore, Φ is CS-consistent.
Since Φ is CS-consistent, there exists a maximal CS-consistent set w ⊇ Φ. Let us show that the set Ψ := {¬P } ∪ (w/C) is also CS-consistent. Indeed, if it were not the case, there would exist formulae
Then, by Corollary 6, there would exist a term s ∈ Tm C such that
But this would imply [(. . . (s · t 1 ) · · · t n−1 ) · t n ] C P ∈ w-a contradiction with the consistency of w.
Since Ψ is also CS-consistent, there exists a maximal CS-consistent set v ⊇ Ψ. Clearly, w/C ⊆ v: i.e., (w, v) ∈ R C . But (w, v) / ∈ R C because this would imply P ∈ v, which would contradict the consistency of v. It follows that R C R C .
Similarly, we can define R E by (w, v) ∈ R E if and only if w/E ⊆ v. However, R E = R E for any C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS. Indeed, it is easy to show that R E ⊆ R E . For the converse direction, assume
LEMMA 17 (TRUTH LEMMA). -Let CS be a constant specification and M be the canonical epistemic model meeting CS. For all formulae A and all worlds w ∈ W , A ∈ w if and only if M, w A .
PROOF. -The proof is by induction on the structure of A. The cases for propositional variables and propositional connectives are immediate by definition of and by the maximal consistency of w. We check the remaining cases:
Assume A ∈ w. Then B ∈ w/i and B ∈ E i (w, t). Consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R i . Since w/i ⊆ v, it follows that B ∈ v, and thus, by induction hypothesis, M, v B. It immediately follows that M, w A.
For the converse, assume M, w [t] i B. By definition of , we get B ∈ E i (w, t), from which [t] i B ∈ w immediately follows by definition of E i .
Case A is [t] E B. Assume A ∈ w and consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R E . Then (w, v) ∈ R i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ h: i.e., w/i ⊆ v. By definition of E E , we have B ∈ E E (w, t). By the maximal consistency of w, it follows that [π i t] i B ∈ w, and thus B ∈ w/i ⊆ v. Since by induction hypothesis, M, v B, we can conclude that M, w A. The argument for the converse repeats the one from the previous case.
Case A is [t] C B. Assume A ∈ w and consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R C : i.e., (w, v) ∈ (R E ) n for some n ≥ 1. As in the previous cases, B ∈ E C (w, t) by definition of E C . It follows from (7) in the proof of Lemma 15 that A ∈ v, and thus, by C-reflexivity and maximal consistency, also B ∈ v. Hence, by induction hypothesis, M, v B. Now M, w A immediately follows. The argument for the converse repeats the one from the previous cases.
Note that, unlike the converse directions in the proof above, the corresponding proofs in the modal case are far from trivial and require additional work (see e.g. (Meyer et al., 1995) ). The last case, in particular, usually requires more sophisticated methods that would guarantee the finiteness of the model. This simplification of proofs in justification logics is yet another benefit of using terms instead of modalities. PROOF. -Soundness was already shown in Lemma 11. For completeness, let M be the canonical model meeting CS and assume CS A. Then {¬A} is CS-consistent and hence is contained in some maximal CS-consistent set w ∈ W . So, by Lemma 17, M, w ¬A, and hence, by Lemma 15, CS A.
THEOREM 18 (COMPLETENESS). -LP
In the case of LP, the finite model property can be demonstrated by restricting the class of epistemic models to the so-called M-models, introduced by Mkrtychev in (Mkrtychev, 1997) . We will now adapt M-models to our logic and prove the finite model property for it. PROOF. -Soundness follows immediately from Lemma 11. Now assume CS A, then {¬A} is CS-consistent, and hence M, w 0 ¬A for some world w 0 ∈ W in the canonical epistemic model M = (W, R, E, ν) meeting CS.
Let M = (W , R , E , ν ) be the restriction of M to {w 0 }: i.e., W := {w 0 }, R i := {(w 0 , w 0 )} for all i, E := E (W × Tm), and ν (P n ) := ν(P n ) ∩ W .
Since M is clearly an M-model meeting CS, it only remains to demonstrate that M , w 0 B if and only if M, w 0 B for all formulae B. We proceed by induction on the structure of B. The cases where either B is a propositional variable or its primary connective is propositional are trivial. Therefore, we only show the case of
Indeed, by Lemma 17, M, w 0 [t] C if and only if [t] C ∈ w 0 , which, by definition of the canonical epistemic model, is equivalent to C ∈ E (w 0 , t) = E (w 0 , t). REMARK 22. -Note that, in the case of LP C h (CS), the finite model property does not imply that common knowledge can be deduced from sufficiently many approximants, unlike in the modal case. This is an immediate consequence of the set
being consistent, as shown in Remark 16. In modal logic, a set analogous to Φ can only be satisfied in infinite models, whereas in our case, due to the evidence function completely taking over the role of the accessibility relations, there is a singleton Mmodel that satisfies Φ.
Conservativity
We extend the two-agent version LP 2 of the Logic of Proofs (Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2008) to an arbitrary h in the natural way and rename it in accordance with our naming scheme:
DEFINITION 23. -The language of LP h is obtained from that of LP C h by restricting the set of operations to · i , + i , and ! i and by dropping all terms from Tm E and Tm C .
The axioms are restricted to application, sum, reflexivity, and inspection for each i. The definition of constant specification is changed accordingly.
We show that LP C h is conservative over LP h by adapting the technique from (Fitting, 2008) , for which evidence terms are essential.
DEFINITION 24. -The mapping × : Fm LP C h → Fm LP h is defined as follows:
1. P × n := P n for propositional variables P n ∈ Prop; 2. × commutes with propositional connectives;
where
PROOF. -Since A × = A for any A ∈ Fm LP h , it suffices to demonstrate that for any Case when D is a propositional tautology. Then so is D × .
Case when D = [t] i B → B is an instance of the reflexivity axiom. Then D × is either the propositional tautology
is an instance of the application axiom. We distinguish the following possibilities:
1. Both t and s contain a subterm from Tm E ∪ Tm C . In this subcase, D × has the form
, which is a propositional tautology and, thus, an axiom of LP h .
Neither t nor s contains a subterm from Tm
× is an instance of the application axiom of LP h . 
Term t contains a subterm from Tm
E ∪ Tm C while s does not. Then D × has the form (B × → C × ) → ([s] i B × → C × ), which can be derived in LP h (CS × ) from the reflexivity axiom [s] i B × → B ×
Term s contains a subterm from Tm
, an instance of the reflexivity axiom of LP h .
is an instance of the sum axiom. We distinguish the following possibilities:
1. Both t and s contain a subterm from Tm E ∪ Tm C . In this subcase, D × has the form B × ∨ B × → B × , which is a propositional tautology and, thus, an axiom of LP h .
2. Neither t nor s contains a subterm from Tm E ∪ Tm C . Then D × is an instance of the sum axiom of LP h .
Term t contains a subterm from Tm
× by propositional reasoning. This is another subcase when translation × does not map an axiom of LP C h to an axiom of LP h .
Term s contains a subterm from Tm
× by propositional reasoning. This is another subcase when translation × does not map an axiom of LP
is an instance of the tupling axiom. We distinguish the following possibilities:
1. At least one of the t i 's contains a subterm from Tm E ∪Tm C . Then D × has the form
× with at least one C i = B × and is, therefore, a propositional tautology.
None of the t i 's contains a subterm from Tm
, which can be derived in LP h (CS × ) from the reflexivity axiom. This is another subcase when translation × does not map an axiom of LP C h to an axiom of LP h . Case when D is an instance of the projection axiom
Case when D is derived by modus ponens is trivial. 
have to be made axioms of LP h . Another option is to use Fitting's concept of embedding one justification logic into another, which involves replacing constants in D with more complicated terms in D × (see (Fitting, 2008) for details).
Forgetful projection and a word on realization
Most justification logics are introduced as explicit counterparts to particular modal logics in the strict sense described in Sect. 1. Although the realization theorem for LP
remains an open problem, in this section we prove that each theorem of our logic LP C h states a valid modal fact if all the terms are replaced with the corresponding modalities, which is one direction of the realization theorem. We also discuss approaches to the more difficult opposite direction.
In the modal language of common knowledge, modal formulae are defined by the grammar
where P j ∈ Prop. The set of all modal formulae is denoted by Fm S4 C h . The Hilbert system S4 C h (Meyer et al., 1995) is given by the modal axioms of S4 for individual agents, by the necessitation rule for 1 , . . . , h , and C, by modus ponens, and by the axioms
is defined as follows:
1. P
• j := P j for propositional variables P j ∈ Prop;
2.
• commutes with propositional connectives;
LEMMA 28. -Let CS be a constant specification. For any formula
PROOF. -The proof is by an easy induction on the derivation of A.
We usually write A r instead of r(A).
We can think of a realization as a function that replaces occurrences of modal operators (including E and C) with evidence terms of the corresponding type. The problem of realization for a given homogeneous C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS can be formulated as follows:
Is there a realization r such that LP
A positive answer to this question would constitute the more difficult direction of the realization theorem, which is often demonstrated by means of induction on a cut-free sequent proof of the modal formula.
The cut-free systems for S4 C h presented in (Alberucci et al., 2005) and (Brünnler et al., 2009 ) are based on an infinitary ω-rule of the form
However, realizing such a rule presents a serious challenge because it requires achieving uniformity among the realizations of the approximants E m A.
Finitizing this ω-rule via the finite model property, Jäger et al. obtain a finitary cut-free system (Jäger et al., 2007) . Unfortunately, the "somewhat unusual" structural properties of the resulting system (see discussion in (Jäger et al., 2007) ) make it hard to use it for realization.
The non-constructive, semantic realization method from (Fitting, 2005 ) cannot be applied directly because of the non-standard behavior of the canonical model (see Remark 16).
Perhaps the infinitary system presented in (Bucheli et al., 2010b) , which is finitely branching but admits infinite branches, can help in proving the realization theorem for LP C h . For now this remains work in progress.
Coordinated attack
To illustrate our logic, we will now analyze the coordinated attack problem along the lines of (Fagin et al., 1995) , where additional references can be found. Let us briefly recall this classical problem. Suppose two divisions of an army, located in different places, are about to attack their enemy. They have some means of communication, but these may be unreliable, and the only way to secure a victory is to attack simultaneously. How should generals G and H who command the two divisions coordinate their attacks? Of course, general G could send a message m G 1 with the time of attack to general H. Let us use the proposition del to denote the fact that the message with the time of attack has been delivered. If the generals trust the authenticity of the message, say because of a signature, the message itself can be taken as evidence that it has been delivered. So general H, upon receiving the message, knows the time of attack: i.e., m G 1 H del. However, since communication is unreliable, G considers it possible that his message has not been delivered. But if general H sends an acknowledgment m H 2 , he in turn cannot be sure whether the acknowledgment has reached G, which prompts yet another acknowledgment m G 3 by general G, and so on. In fact, common knowledge of del is a necessary condition for the attack. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume it to be common knowledge between the generals that they should only attack simultaneously or not attack at all, i.e., that they attack only if both know that they attack: [t] C (att → [s] E att) for some terms s and t. Thus, by the induction axiom, we get att → [ind(t, s)] C att. Another reasonable assumption is that it is common knowledge that neither general attacks unless the message with the time of attack has been delivered: [r] C (att → del) for some term r. Using the application axiom, we obtain att → [r · ind(t, s)] C del.
received by them 4 , does not generally create common knowledge of A for the same reasons that were discussed in the previous section. In fact, there exist general results about the impossibility of achieving common knowledge via certain modes of communication, e.g., in asynchronous systems (Fagin et al., 1995) . Clearly, an introduction of evidence terms cannot and should not change this general phenomenon.
However, there exist modes of communication that ensure that a transmission of a common knowledge evidence term to all the agents in the group does create common knowledge among the agents. A prime example of such a mode is, of course, public announcements, a well-known method of creating common knowledge. Thus, one of the benefits of our system of terms is a finite encoding of common knowledge, which is largely infinitary in nature. This finite encoding enables to transmit evidence, which, under certain modes of communication, creates common knowledge among the agents. Of course, common knowledge can also be created by a public announcement of the fact itself rather than of evidence in support of the fact. There is an important difference, however. When, in his seminal 1989 work (Plaza, 2007) , Plaza analyzed one of the standard stories used to explain the concept of common knowledge, the Muddy Children Puzzle, in order to explain how common knowledge is created by a public announcement, he had to assume that the announcements are truthful and the agents are trustful. Indeed, an announced fact cannot become common knowledge, or any kind of knowledge, if the fact is false. And clearly, if the agents do not trust the announcement, their knowledge would only change provided they can verify the announced facts.
Verifiability of announcements is exactly what we achieve by introducing evidence terms into the language. An agent who receives a justification for A needs neither to assume that A is true nor to trust the speaker because the agent can simply verify the received information. A similar idea of supplying messages with justifications can be used to describe a distributed system that authorizes the disbursement of sensitive data, such as medical records, while maintaining a specified privacy policy (Blass et al., 2011) . Interestingly, like in our analysis of the coordinated attack, the authors also propose to use the sender's signature as evidence for the information about his/her intentions or policies.
Verifiability of evidence turns out to be sufficient for creating common knowledge. Indeed, Yavorskaya considered a situation where agents can verify each other's evidence: (Sidon), 2008) . The ! j i -operation implicitly presumes communication since i's evidence t has to be somehow available to agent j. It is not hard to show that an addition of this operation to our logic leads to a situation where any individual knowledge also automatically creates common knowledge of the same fact: for any term t ∈ Tm i , there is a term s(x) ∈ Tm C such that [t] i A → [s(t)] C A. However, the mode of communication necessary for the 4. Unreliable communication does not prevent knowledge from being explicit. Thus, in the context of explicit vs. tacit knowledge, we only discuss the usefulness of evidence terms that have been received by the agent(s). ! j i -operation to work must be reliable and immediate, which restricts the applicability of such a logic; for instance, it precludes an analysis of asynchronous systems. In summary, the kind of knowledge that can be induced via justification transmission is generally the same as in the case of statement transmission and depends primarily on the mode of communication, on its reliability.
So another benefit of introducing evidence terms is their verifiability, including cases when evidence terms are communicated between agents. Yet another benefit, this time on the meta-logical level, is an ability to analyze common knowledge and the process of its creation. Similar to Artemov's analysis of the famous Gettier examples in (Artemov, 2008) , the system of evidence terms for common knowledge can also be used to uncover hidden assumptions. Further, as shown in the previous section, it can yield new scenarios for well-known epistemic puzzles.
Our contribution in this paper is technical in the sense that we aim to study neither the nature of common knowledge nor ways of transmitting data to achieve it. Our goal is to provide tools for analyzing the fine structure of common knowledge, tools that can be used, irrespective of the mode of communication between the agents, even when the communication itself remains on the meta-logical level as in the standard rendition of the Muddy Children Puzzle, e.g., in (Fagin et al., 1995) .
Conclusions
We have presented a justification logic LP C h with common knowledge, which is a conservative extension of the multi-agent justification logic LP h . The major open problem at the moment remains proving the realization theorem, one direction of which we have demonstrated.
Our analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the language of LP C h shows that access to evidence creates more alternatives than the classical modal approach. In particular, the lack of knowledge can occur either because messages are not delivered or because evidence of authenticity is missing.
We have mostly concentrated on the study of C-axiomatically appropriate constant specifications. For modeling distributed systems with different reasoning capabilities of agents, it is also interesting to consider i-axiomatic appropriate, E-axiomatic appropriate, and heterogeneous constant specifications, where only certain aspects of reasoning are common knowledge.
We established soundness and completeness with respect to epistemic models and singleton M-models. The question remains whether other semantics for justification logics such as (arithmetical) provability semantics (Artemov, 1995; Artemov, 2001) and game semantics (Renne, 2009b) can be adapted to LP C h . Further avenues of research include but are not limited to the decidability of LP C h , the comparison of its complexity to that of S4 C h , and the extension of our treatment of common knowledge to the logics with the individual modalities of type K, K5, etc.
A long-term goal of our research is to find justification counterparts of dynamic epistemic logics with common knowledge. A step in this direction (although still without common knowledge) was made in (Bucheli et al., 2010a) by proposing a justification counterpart to public announcement logic. Clearly, both types of systems, explicit counterparts to common knowledge logics and to dynamic epistemic logics, will have to be studied on their own first, before being combined.
